Abstract: There appears to be a strong upward drift in policy-related economic uncertainty after 1960. We consider two classes of explanations for this rise. The first stresses growth in government spending, taxes, and regulation. A second stresses increased political polarization and its implications for the policy-making process and policy choices. While the evidence is inconclusive, it suggests that both factors play a role in driving the secular increase in policy uncertainty over the last half century.
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I. Rising Policy Uncertainty
There appears to be a strong upward drift in policy-related uncertainty after 1960. As evidence, Figure 1 plots a newspaper-based index of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) for the United States, showing a secular rise over the last half century. The EPU index, drawn from Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) , relies on scaled frequency counts of newspaper articles that contain terms pertaining to the economy, uncertainty, and economic policy.
1 Baker et al. (2013) also find a strong rise in the frequency of discussions of policy-related uncertainty in the Federal
Reserve's periodic "Beige Book" releases from 1983 (first release) to 2012, suggesting that
Beige Book survey respondents also perceive a rise in policy uncertainty. This rise in economic policy uncertainty is potentially damaging to US growth (Bloom, 2013) .
II. Policy Uncertainty and the Scale of Government Activity
Alongside the EPU index, Figure Regulations, an annual publication that compiles all federal regulations in effect in a given year.
The index rose more than six-fold after 1950, highlighting a tremendous expansion in the extent and complexity of federal regulations. Uncertainty about the existence, meaning and enforcement of government regulations likely increases with their scale and complexity. The size 1 Specifically, Baker et al. search the digital archives of 6 newspapers (Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post) for articles containing 'uncertain' or 'uncertainty'; plus 'economy', 'economic', 'industry', 'industrial', 'commerce' or 'business'; plus 'congress', 'deficit', 'federal reserve', 'legislation', 'regulation' or 'white house'. The monthly frequency counts for each paper are scaled by the number of all articles in the same paper and month, and averaged for the overall index.
and complexity of the U.S. tax code also grew dramatically in recent decades, as discussed in Joint Committee on Taxation (2001) and National Taxpayer Advocate (2012).
In summary, secular growth in government spending and taxes relative to GDP and the greater scale and complexity of both government regulations and the tax code are likely contributors to the rise in policy-related economic uncertainty. The payoffs associated with private economic decisions are increasingly affected by government activities and policies that are subject to change. Of course, an expanded role for government could bring benefits that outweigh the costs, and a greater role for government could lower overall economic uncertainty even as it raises policy-related uncertainty. For example, an expansive tax-funded social safety net serves as an automatic fiscal stabilizer that dampens fluctuations in output and employment.
Moreover, many financial regulations seek to reduce uncertainty associated with financial crises and their spillovers to the rest of the economy. Nevertheless, Figure 1 suggests that the secular growth in government is one reason for rising policy uncertainty.
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III. Political Polarization and Policy Uncertainty
Another class of explanations for rising policy uncertainty stresses the potential for political polarization to produce more extreme policies, less policy stability, and less capacity of Even amidst partisan rancor, investors in the U.S. economy traditionally take solace in the extensive checks and balances embedded in the American constitution. Divided government, Senate obstructionism, and opposition from co-partisan legislators often derail presidential policy initiatives. In recent years, however, these sources of status quo bias often reinforced rather than reduced policy uncertainty. The status quo is unattractive when the debt ceiling must be raised to avoid default, or fiscal adjustment is required for a sustainable debt path. Yet change from the status quo under American-style separation of powers typically requires the agreement of both parties, creating tensions that can lead to high-stakes bargaining scenarios in which political incentives for brinkmanship create high levels of uncertainty.
Political polarization can also increase policy uncertainty in more subtle ways. Presidents of both parties have increasingly politicized the bureaucracy by appointing partisan loyalists and shifting key policy decisions to White House operatives not subject to Senate confirmation (e.g., Moe, 1985) . In contrast to the early postwar period, when appointed regulators held the upper hand vis-à-vis political appointees, the policy environment is now more prone to rapid swings between an aggressive regulatory stance and a more hands-off approach. The tendency toward rapid switching of regulatory regimes intensifies when presidents respond to legislative gridlock by implementing policy agendas through executive orders and other forms of "unilateral action"
(e.g., Howell 2003) . Because successor presidents can readily reverse unilateral executive actions, the effect is to increase long-term policy uncertainty.
III.a. Polarization of voters and districts?
The most popular measure of Congressional polarization is based on the NOMINATE scores of Poole and Rosenthal (1985) , which estimate the ideological locations of legislators based on their roll-call voting behavior. As displayed in Figure 2 , the ideological gap between
Democrats and Republicans has been increasing since the 1960s according to this measure.
Several alternative Congress-based measures, including ones based on campaign finance records (Bonica, 2013) and textual analysis of the congressional record (Jensen et al., 2012) , also show a pronounced secular increase in the ideological distance between Democratic and Republican legislators and a precipitous decline in moderate legislators.
One potential reason for this increasing polarization of policymakers is the increasing polarization of voters. However, an important puzzle for political scientists is the absence of evidence for a corresponding polarization in the policy preferences of the public during the same period (Fiorina, 2010) , and relatedly, the growing number of Americans who classify themselves as "independents." Voter preferences seem to be unipolar -most voters report preferring centrist policies -and this pattern has not changed much over time. The correlation between policy attitudes and voting behavior has increased somewhat, but this "sorting" has taken place almost exclusively on non-economic dimensions of partisan conflict (e.g., Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder, 2006) . Also, polarization of the economics-oriented content of published party platforms has fluctuated rather than consistently increased. Yet as shown in Figure 2 , voters perceive the parties' overall platforms to be diverging steadily, a perception that is highly correlated with the newspaper-based EPU index. 
McCarty et al. (2013) suggest the large difference in roll-call voting behavior between
Democrats and Republicans is related to the internal ideological heterogeneity of many suburban and exurban "centrist" districts. Given that voter perceptions of party platforms are driven by highly vocal partisans from the ideologically homogeneous districts in the tails of the distribution, it is difficult for candidates in heterogeneous centrist districts to credibly position themselves as moderates. Rather, they opt for a strategy of mobilizing core supporters who are more likely to turn out, especially in primary elections. The growing availability of householdlevel data for use in micro-targeted campaign materials only enhances the appeal of this strategy.
Two other factors frequently mentioned as solutions to rising political polarization are rising media polarization and rising income inequality. While media polarization does not appear to have directly polarized voters or districts, this phenomenon has perhaps encouraged politicians to cater to core supporters rather than independents. Research finds that the direct link between partisan media and political polarization is weak. Polarization began more than a decade before the advent of Fox News and MSNBC, political views have been relatively constant, and notably, most voters either avoid partisan news altogether or select an ideological spectrum of programming (e.g., Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011) . At the same time, however, cable TV itself may have contributed to polarization by letting viewers choose entertainment over news, thereby decreasing politicians' exposure to less partisan voters and incentivizing their focus on politically active partisans (Prior, 2013) .
Likewise, rising income inequality could facilitate legislative polarization in a number of ways, even if mass opinion has not polarized. One possibility is that greater income inequality raises the political stakes for the rich as they realize the median voter has more to gain from redistributive policies. A related argument is that politicians are more responsive to rich than poor voters (e.g., Gilens, 2012) . Thus, as the right tail of the income distribution pulls outward, the right-leaning party shifts away from centrist policies.
III.b. Institutional dynamics
When discussing political polarization, media pundits and reformers often stress institutional factors that might be amenable to change, such as campaign finance and the structure of primary elections. One claim is that low-turnout primary elections are an important factor in the rise of polarization. Anecdotal evidence suggests that incumbents now avoid casting bipartisan votes that would have been uncontroversial in the 1970s, because they fear inducing a well-funded primary challenger. Incumbent candidates certainly face primary threats, and these threats may influence roll-call voting incentives. However, most states introduced congressional primaries before the rise in polarization, and even in states that adopted primaries more recently, electoral reform is not associated with increased within-state polarization (Hirano et al., 2010) .
A more significant change to elections and campaigns since the 1970s involves campaign finance. In particular, individual donors have replaced political action committees (PACs) as the most important source of campaign finance. While PACs tend to be ideologically moderate and flexible, individual donors tend to be more extreme and rigid. Barber (2013) links these developments to polarization; when states increase individual donor limits, state-level legislative polarization increases.
IV. Conclusion
As the reach of government has expanded, the rhetoric of the major parties has become more polarized, and legislators have found fewer incentives to cast the bipartisan votes needed to solve basic problems in a political system with divided powers. These trends closely track a secular increase in policy-related economic uncertainty. We hope this paper serves to introduce a nascent research agenda aimed at explaining the interplay of uncertainty, polarization, and government growth. The next step in this agenda is a focus on causality, which will require investment in cross-state and cross-national analysis as well as historical research. Baker et al. (2013) . Polarization of roll-calls from NOMINATE. SD of district presidential vote shares from authors' calculations. Voter perception of party differences calculated from American National Election Study data. All variables except policy uncertainty normalized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
that secular changes in sectoral output shares affect the trend behavior of newspaper coverage of sectoral economic uncertainty in the same direction.
Rescaling the Newspaper-Based Index of Economic Policy Uncertainty
The EPU index displayed in Figures 1 and 2 could be affected by exogenous changes over time in the mix of newspaper articles. Suppose, for example, that newspapers devote a secularly rising share of articles to economic matters because readership gradually shifts towards people with greater appetite for business and financial news. As another example, suppose that newspapers gradually shift toward hard news, economics included, because other media (television) increasingly supply a greater share of high-quality entertainment for public consumption. In these examples, a gradual increase in the fraction of newspaper articles devoted to economic matters leads, for our purposes, to a spurious secular rise in the EPU index. To address this concern, we scale the monthly frequency count of EPU articles by the count of articles that contain one of the "economy" terms rather than scaling by the count of all articles. , 1940--2010 14
